Nintendo Switch

After hearing how Nintendo started using different (worse) screens in more recent Switch consoles I compared a load of units in person and found 3 different types, one of which is no longer being used. The launch era screens are super bright and colourful, they seem to have been using them to some extent up to the launch of Odyssey. From mid-2017 onwards though they've been using two other types, one of which is nowhere near as bright but still good (as long as you don't put it side by side with a launch one) and a second one which is just as dull and has an AWFUL yellow tint that is super noticeable. If you buy a Switch now it's pot luck if you get the decent screen or the atrocious yellow one, although the latter seems to be rarer.

Thankfully I managed to find a brand new Odyssey bundle with the launch screen and promptly snapped it up, I was holding on for a nicer special edition unit or price drop, but the difference is so noticeable that I just had to bite the bullet.

Hallo,

bin momentan auf Dienstreise und habe das Ladekabel für meine Switch vergessen

Kann ich das Ladekabel von meinem Samsung S8 benutzen ohne die Switch zu schrotten

Hab paar Post weiter was davon gelesen das durch Docks von Drittanbietern die Switch kaputt gegangen ist daher die Frage ob das beim Ladekabel auch der fall ist.

This is a full, bootROM level arbitrary code execution exploit. This gives the exploiter full access to everything.
The ability to write to the bootROM is protected by a fuse, essentially meaning it's also impossible to modify once it's been written to initially. This means that it's impossible for Nintendo or any other manufacturer to patch on existing hardware with an update, it's only possible to fix it on new devices.

Vulnerability Summary

The USB software stack provided inside the boot instruction rom (IROM/bootROM) contains a copy operation whose length can be controlled by an attacker. By carefully constructing a USB control request, an attacker can leverage this vulnerability to copy the contents of an attacker-controlled buffer over the active execution stack, gaining control of the Boot and Power Management processor (BPMP) before any lock-outs or privilege reductions occur. This execution can then be used to exfiltrate secrets and to load arbitrary code onto the main CPU Complex (CCPLEX) "application processors" at the highest possible level of privilege (typically as the TrustZone Secure Monitor at PL3/EL3).